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Technically Speaking: On Equipping and Evaluating
“Unnatural” Language Learners
Joshua Reno

ABSTRACT This article compares different communicative trials for apes in captivity and children with autism
in order to investigate how ideological assumptions about linguistic agency and impairment are constructed and
challenged in practice. To the extent that Euro-American techniques of “unnatural” language instruction developed
during the Cold War era have been successful, it is because communicative interactions are broken down into basic
components and would-be language learners are equipped with materials, devices and habits that make up for
their distinct bio/social deficits. Such linguistic equipment can present a challenge to the ideological presumption
of a subject inherently gifted with the rudiments of talk, that is, the human as naturally speaking. However, this
ideology can reassert itself if the active contribution of unnatural language learners to their technoscientific trials
is downplayed. In order to counter this tendency, I propose that speech acts be reimagined as part of a more
encompassing semiotic ensemble. [language development, semiotics, materiality, posthumanism, linguistic ideology]

INTRODUCTION

I

t is a mid morning meeting in a trailer adjoining a South
London primary school. We are visitors to a “special
school” for children with autism spectrum conditions, our
children. As they begin classes for the day, we consume tea
and biscuits and discuss strategies for developing life skills
and coping with everyday challenges. The composition of the
morning group changes month to month, but like the school
population as a whole is typically a mix of lifelong Londoners
and recent immigrants, predominantly from West Africa
and the Caribbean. Despite our obvious differences, we
recount strikingly similar experiences raising children with
social, linguistic, and cognitive impairments in the United
Kingdom.
At one point, the group leader—a special needs consultant to the school—mentions the Picture Exchange Communication System (“PECS”), so-called because it recasts
interpersonal communication as a form of reciprocal trade,
substituting the “exchange of words” with the exchange of
visual icons. Reactions are characteristically mixed. PECS is
one of few developmental tools thought by special needs
practitioners to have a reliable “evidence base”; consequently, it is frequently introduced at training sessions and
meetings like this one. Most of us became aware of PECS
shortly after receiving a diagnosis and, by the time our children began school, had already tried it. My wife and I had

been using PECS with our son Charlie for two years, but not
consistently. Several parents confess that they had stopped
using it altogether. One person attributes this to their child
losing interest, but a few mothers offer different reasons.
They express concern that signing with objects will actually
hinder development. If their child is nonverbal, they worry
PECS will impede speech acquisition; if they are verbal, their
parents worry that they will regress.
Behind these anxieties is a linear vision of child development that parents and carers of people on the autism
spectrum know well, a sense that our children are “behind” or “delayed”—“two steps forward, three steps back”
as morning group members sometimes say. The parents that
spoke up about their concerns, concerns that many morning
group attendees recognized, voiced an understanding of normal language development as involving a movement away
from the comanipulation of external objects and toward independently produced, internalized speech acts. This is a
culturally particular model of language learning shared by
developmental specialists throughout the United Kingdom
and elsewhere, who gauge the utility of communicative aids
like PECS based on whether or not they will lead to full
speech.
In this article, I consider contemporary technoscientific
trials such as PECS, which were designed for impaired language learners, including children on the autism spectrum

c 2012 by the American Anthropological
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 406–419, ISSN 0002-7294, online ISSN 1548-1433. 
Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1433.2012.01442.x

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Reno

and apes in captivity. I focus in particular on the ways their
semiotic development is shaped by and potentially challenges
normative assumptions surrounding who speaks and how.
Like many other assistive and augmentative communication devices, PECS relies on the objectification of communicative prowess. Indeed, some speech therapists refer
to the PECS binder, with its store of small picture symbols,
as the child’s actual “voice.” In so doing, I argue, they unsettle the pervasive ideological model of the naturally speaking human subject. Unequipped, save for their “internal”
talents, the cultural figure of the naturally speaking subject
lurks behind depictions of linguistic action and the human
condition generally. The very idea of language “acquisition”
implies that speech is something owned, a property that we
comfortably possess, rather than a skill that most, but not
all, are equipped for, which requires practice and may involve lifelong struggle. But what happens when a language
user lacks the biophysical and/or social resources that are
thought necessary for linguistic competence? Can they ever
become a fully fledged linguistic agent? I consider situations
where an artificial platform of materials, devices, and habits
makes up for seemingly “internal” deficits, thereby enabling
forms of linguistic or protolinguistic skill. I describe these
assistive forms as linguistic equipment in order to highlight the distributed nature of sociocognitive competencies
(Cowley 2003, 2007; Everett 2012) and to question the idea
that an instinct for communicative interaction is ever internalized to such a degree that it cannot be lost or suppressed.
Based on experiences with PECS I observed in
London workshops, schools, parent group meetings and in
my own home, and in juxtaposition to the unnatural language learning of nonhuman apes, I conclude that breaking
down communicative interaction into objectual forms can
afford new opportunities for semiotic development. At the
same time, if the active contribution of impaired learners is
downplayed, or if the role of their more skilled instructors is
overemphasized, experiments at the ideological boundaries
of communicative competence may not appear to transform
unnatural learners into full-fledged linguistic actors at all
but, rather, reassert the gap that separates them. Insofar
as unnatural language learning involves, not only conspicuous linguistic equipment but also additional interlocutors
to facilitate its use, in fact, it may serve to perform new
figurations of the naturally speaking subject. The tensions
surrounding this ideology are apparent not only in face-toface meetings with parents and practitioners but also in the
wider debates within the health and human sciences surrounding children with autism and nonhuman apes, where
different experimental trials are thought to reveal their
natures.
The delicacy of linguistic competencies becomes apparent when normative definitions of the human are challenged by different forms of impairment. Scholars in disability studies have documented how, historically and in
the present day, the differently equipped bodies of disabled
persons are denied the recognition of being fully human
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(Albrecht et al. 2001; Davis 2005; Mitchell and Snyder
1997). This form of prejudice is especially acute, arguably,
when that impairment manifests linguistically and disabled
persons lack a recognized “voice” to speak on their own
behalf. My own interest in impaired communication began when my wife and I realized our son Charlie was not
learning to speak. Typically autism spectrum conditions are
identified with reference to three bundled traits: complications with language development, difficulty with social
relations and situations, and a desire for sameness and repetition. The precise origins of these traits are not clear, nor
how it is that they manifest so differently in different people, but it makes sense that a person experiencing social
and behavioral irregularities would also find linguistic interaction difficult. According to long-term studies, between
one third and two thirds of those diagnosed with autism
spectrum conditions “never acquire useful spoken language”
(Carr and Felce 2007:780).1
Over the last several decades, the popular and contested
trope of “alienness” has spread as a way of accounting for
this gap between people on the spectrum and the so-called
“neuro-typicals” that surround them. Ian Hacking (2009)
reviews the role of the alien metaphor in fiction, activism,
and personal narratives, arguing that it is based on mutual
nonrecognition, exacerbated by the social impairments that
people with ASD experience: difficulty attending to social
cues, interpreting the motives of others, and engaging in
normative forms of thought and behavior. More than that,
Hacking argues that the alien metaphor stands for the absence
of a “bedrock” of a “shared form of life”; without this an
“artificial platform must be constructed” to enable mutual
understanding across this divide (2009:56).
Some of those on the spectrum may rely on conspicuous, sometimes controversial material platforms to
speak, including PECS, iPads, robots and dogs (Dautenhahn
and Werry 2004; Solomon 2010). Those without the ability
to speak or write are unlikely to be recognized in public
debates about their condition, its causes and effects, or proposed medical interventions and “cures.” They will thus be
less able to contribute to the public construction of autism
as a form of disease or identity, crisis or human possibility (see Nadesan 2005). In this respect, they challenge not
only the accepted format for the public inclusion of difference in multicultural democracies (Bumiller 2008) but
also anthropological characterizations of human beings as
essentially self-expressive and reflexive creatures. I trust
most anthropologists would hesitate before labeling people
on the spectrum “inhuman,” but others are not so reluctant. Several recent studies have attempted to categorize
“autistic children” as closer to chimpanzees or robots than
human beings, on the grounds that they lack the ability to
learn “culture” or understand other people’s intentions (see
Gernsbacher 2007). Although highly controversial, such
claims are bolstered by the difficulties that people on
the spectrum often demonstrate with speech and social
interaction.
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And yet, if one attends to the unique communicative strategies of nonverbal people, simple accounts of
communicative “incompetence” are called into question
(Ochs et al. 2005:567). In Charlie’s case, for examples,
a repertoire of communicative signals help him coconstruct
meaningful interactions with others in place of formal language. I would characterize these various idiosyncratic communication strategies as home signing. Home sign systems
are “ad hoc” and “developed to meet an individual’s or
a small group’s needs for communicating” (Senghas and
Monaghan 2002:75). Although typically used to describe
the signing practices of people who are medically deaf, in
principle “home signing” can also be used to describe the
unique semiotic idiolects that autistic and other learningdisabled persons develop.2
It is in deference to the idiosyncrasy of home signing
that I have not written an article about “autism” generalizing
exclusively from my experiences with my son. In this way I
adhere to a maxim, popular among people in the diverse and
contested autism spectrum community: “if you know one
autistic person . . . you know one autistic person.” Although
the home signing practices of people on the spectrum vary
considerably, my investigation is inspired also by encounters
with other parents from South London who share many of the
same concerns about their children, especially their linguistic
development.
Linguistic impairment has become a topic of interest for psycho- and sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists in recent years, in part because abnormal language development demonstrates the resilience of language
learners (Goldin-Meadow 2003), and the socially embedded coconstruction of meaningful interaction generally.
In some ways, this was prefigured by explorations into
the early stages of language development (Haviland 1998;
Ochs and Schieffelin 1996). Just as the communicative limitations of infants and toddlers do not prevent them from
contributing to participant interactions, impaired speakers can overcome various “internal” obstacles and deficits
in the course of communicative interaction, including
aphasia (Goodwin 2000, 2004), autism spectrum conditions (Ochs et al. 2004; Ochs et al. 2005) and medical deafness (Hoffmann-Dilloway 2011; Levinson 2006;
Senghas and Monaghan 2002).
These investigations reveal linguistic competence as a
collective achievement, rather than a natural guarantee. At
the same time, the documentation of such cases may presuppose and entail the projection of a naturally speaking
subject, a being lurking beneath the impairment who, by
virtue of their humanity and biology, is driven to communicate3 Brian Keith Axel (2006) describes this as an aspect of
a “modern linguistic ideology” unwittingly propagated since
the Cold War, which conceives of the human “as a naturally speaking being and as the material and corporeal origin
and agent of communication” (2006:356–357). As a consequence of this assumption, the human body is fetishized as
the “place of origin of communication in the form of speech”

and when technologies of communication are objectified into
linguistic equipment, they are taken to be mere “instruments
of prosthesis” (Axel 2006:373). If linguistic actors appear to
be the instruments of their prostheses, and not the other
way around, their “natural” ability and desire to communicate is placed in doubt and their cultural figuration as one
who speaks is compromised.
It is interesting to reflect on ideologies of communication related to the naturally speaking human in light of
the prominence of so-called “posthuman” theoretical approaches. As Latour suggests, being able to “speak” is often
thought to be the sine qua non for recognition as a legitimate
agent (2004:66). If there is a skill that sustains an attachment
to human narcissism, it is language. The apparent effortlessness with which most infants develop language not only
maintains anthropocentric attitudes but also can also obscure
the interactional basis of speech, as do the “internalist” theories of language acquisition associated with Noam Chomsky
and Steven Pinker (see Cowley 2006).
Precisely because ideological conceptions of language
are so deeply rooted in the projects of modernity (Bauman
and Briggs 2003), Christianity (Keane 2007) and the nation
(Anderson 1991; Warner 1990) investigating sites where
the boundaries of the human–nonhuman are being linguistically redefined can reveal politically and morally evocative tensions. In an approach that parallels Axel’s, Webb
Keane argues that interpretations of language use are mediated by semiotic ideologies: “basic assumptions about what
signs are and how they function in the world” (2003:419).
Such ideologies would include assumptions about what sorts
of being are likely to speak and how. The technoscientific trials of semiotic engineering that interest me here, for
example, share an implicit secular materialism: it is seen
as reasonable that nonhuman animals or even artificial life
forms might learn language, regardless of their particular socio/genetic deficits, but that otherworldly or spiritual beings
might “speak” is deemed inadmissible.
Exploring the tensions and controversies that surround
nonhuman language development also illuminates those associated with PECS and other assistive and augmentative
communication devices. In keeping with the insights of
Ochs et al. (2005) and Ochs and Solomon (2010), derived
from their Ethnography of Autism project, I discuss how linguistic equipment can potentially conform Euro-American
interactional styles to the idiosyncratic competencies of impaired speakers, even as they expose ideologies of communication concerning what counts as a fully fledged linguistic
actor.
LANGUAGE AND TECHNICS

Resemblances between the linguistic trials of disabled persons and nonhuman apes are not accidental, but are directly
motivated by and embroiled within a particular epistemological tradition of the human sciences that I characterize
as “mechanistic.”4 Recent genealogies, Axel’s among them,
have called attention to the influence that U.S. government
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and military sponsorship had on human sciences prior to and
during the Cold War, and the importance of the parallel
wartime intellectual projects of behaviorism and cybernetics, both of which incorporated terms and tools from engineering in an attempt to bridge the social and natural sciences
(see Boyer 2010; Price 2008). Both approaches were highly
influential, partly because they shared a focus on the rationalization and control of human and nonhuman systems,
conceived as machinelike relays for inputs and outputs of
observable stimuli and information.5
For the technoscientific trials that arise from these epistemological traditions, PECS among them, impaired language learners represent a problem for semiotic reengineering. According to Mara Mills (2010), disabled persons were crucial in the development of Euro-American
mechanistic epistemologies from the 19th-century onward.
In the 1940s, for example, medically deaf people played
a critical role in the development of speech wave visualization, ultimately contributing to the growth of telecommunications and cybernetic theories of signal transmission.
Keating and Mirus (2003) describe similar trials involving
contemporary mass media, as members of the linguistically
“Deaf” community (as opposed to the medically “deaf”) innovate new forms of linguistic practice through their use
of information and communication technology and, in so
doing, redefine the interactional parameters of the internet.
My own focus is not the innovation of new communication epistemologies or technologies, but the moral and
ideological implications that surround “who speaks” in contemporary linguistic encounters involving established sociotechnical ensembles and seemingly “unnatural” language
learners. The value of behaviorist and cybernetic perspectives for such linguistic experimentation is that they allow
teachers to ignore the “black box” of the subject, whatever
its “internal” deficits may be. Instead communicative interactions are broken down into observable and manipulable
patterns of stimulus and response, input and output, which
are not only easier to teach but also to test.
One can usefully compare this model of semiotic engineering to the famous Turing Test. Logician and mathematician Alan Turing proposed one of the first experiments
involving human–nonhuman communication as a method
of evaluating artificial intelligence (AI). Although ostensibly
testing to see whether a machine could fool a human by
mimicking one, Turing’s proposal—which would guide AI
research for decades—began with assumption that the ability
to converse distinguishes an actor one cannot see as identifiably human. In a way, Turing’s thought experiment was
a commentary on humanness appropriate for the burgeoning era of global telecommunications, where instantaneous
contact had to be reconciled with an existing culture of discursive interaction. As N. Katherine Hayles (1999) notes,
the Turing Test offered a cybernetic vision: when something
as distinctly human as interpersonal dialogue can be distilled
from its bodily enactment and duplicated in digital code, it
is not just that computers are elevated to AI, human bodies
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are revealed to be no more than incidental media for the
transmission of messages.6
Rather than claim the posthuman loss of an analogue subject to digital circuitry, however, I would argue that insofar
as the Turing Test makes a linguistically competent human
the ultimate judge of the computer’s imitation, the communicative exceptionalism of the former is digitally reaffirmed.
Indeed the problem with such scaled down communicative
interaction is that, useful as it is for the AI mimic, it cannot ultimately fool the human judge. Like the Turing Test,
other forms of technically mediated, scaled down semiosis
consistently raise doubts as to who is really speaking.
By describing semiotic reengineering as “scaled-down,”
I do not mean to caricature gestural or technically mediated
communication as a more primitive form of semiosis. This is
the case in “gesture first” theories of language evolution, for
example, which hold that gesture is a less developed semiotic
practice, one that was likely used by our common great ape
ancestor and gradually evolved into natural human language
(Corballis 2003). One can detect in this argument similar
assumptions about language development as are voiced by
some parents and carers of disabled people described above.
As with uneasiness with a communicative aid like PECS,
some evolutionary accounts reflect a presumed hierarchy
of semiotic forms, with externally manifest, material expressions like gesture at the bottom and internally present,
mental entities like grammar at the top.
Even if one were to set aside the complete grammars
of human sign languages, it is inaccurate to separate gesture
as a less developed form of verbal language. Many scholars
of nonverbal communication recognize an indivisible unity
of gesture and speech (see McNeiil 1996; Streeck, Goodwin and LeBaron 2011). As David McNeill et al. (2008)
and others argue, gestural acts cannot be parsed out as less
complex or “pre-linguistic” forms in order to explain language; rather, the entirety of communication is what needs
explaining. I would go further and suggest that the growth
of human gesture, and therefore language, has to be understood alongside the development of a wider ensemble of
technical form and practice.
According to André Leroi-Gourhan, “techniques involve both gestures and tools, sequentially organized by
means of a ‘syntax’ that impart both fixity and flexibility
to the series of operations involved.” (1993:114). Thus,
the technics of early humans and industrial societies cannot
be understood apart from the gestural activities or “operational sequences” of which they are the material precipitate. Following Leroi-Gourhan, language must be reconsidered as technical and gestural, and technology must be
more broadly cast as semiotic practice. Because technological forms spread well beyond the immediacy of face-to-face
interactions, however, there is a pervasive tendency to separate technology from language as two interconnected but
relatively autonomous social fields.
Consider one of the rarely discussed origin stories
of Actor-Network Theory. Based on collaborations with
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primatologist Shirley Strum, Latour suggests that face-toface interaction cannot account for the durability and complicatedness of the societies that humans construct (Callon
and Latour 1981). Baboons might establish their societies
from scratch, through constant negotiation of complex local hierarchies, but with humans it is different: “the basic
social skills, although still present, offer [a] restricted repertoire. Most of the far-reaching and long-lasting associations
are made by something else” (Latour 2005:65). This “something else” is the material “equipment” through which human societies are made durable, without which they would
still be “complex”—just as baboon groups are—but far less
complicated (2005:197).
Another way of accounting for the boundary between
complicatedness and complexity is with reference to language. As Marilyn Strathern (n.d.) argues in a recent paper, which engages with Latour et al.’s baboon story, the
Tor communities of Western Papua New Guinea may have
once had very little in the way of material culture, but still
managed to “multiply” themselves, and introduce further
complication in their day to day lives, through their use
of intricate kin terminology.7 Indeed, by dismissing “face
to face” interaction, Latour et al. fail to note the enduring
social forms and cultural values generated out of the reflexive pragmatics of talk (see Silverstein 2003; Silverstein and
Urban 1996). Generally speaking, this is in keeping with the
social study of science and technology, where talk is rarely
acknowledged as a special form of material practice. Where
language is given a role, it is as one form of representation
among many, alongside photographs, diagrams and other
“inscriptions” (see Latour 1987; Lynch and Woolgar 1990).8
At the same time, there is something intriguing about
the idea that it is not only language but also “equipment” that
separates humans from nonhumans. If technics are regarded
in the sense that Leroi-Gourhan encouraged, then it is possible to recognize distinctively human communication as part
of a larger semiotic ensemble that includes gesture, speech,
and material technics, excluding none as prior or primitive.
As Latour writes, “no beings, not even humans, speak on
their own, but always through something or someone else”
(2004:68). If all of us are so equipped, regardless of real
and perceived deficits, with such an ensemble, we also equip
each other to speak. Indeed, we are each other’s linguistic
equipment.
PRIMATES FACE TO FACE

During the Cold War there was a flurry of interest in primatology involving experiments with transspecies communication and sociality, both in the lab and in the wild. The
use of trained nonhuman primates in the space race is well
known. The reason similar experiments spread throughout
mainstream and popular science in the late 20th century,
Donna Haraway argues, is that at a time when anxieties
were growing about the denaturalization of humankind and
the destruction of nature, primatology offered redemptive
narratives that placed “animals just at or over the line into

‘culture’” and people “at or over the line into ‘nature’”
(1989:148).
Tool using and gesturing great apes are our closest genetic relatives and seem to possess some of the same affinities
for social interaction. Over the last half-century, many have
wondered why it is, then, that chimpanzees, gorillas, and
orangutans do not talk and, more precisely, what it means
that we alone among primates do. The simplest explanation is that they lack the biocognitive resources to produce
complex vocalizations, learn and remember subtle linguistic
rules, and achieve symbolic understanding (Deacon 1997).
Of course it could also be said that neither do apes in the
wild have people using language around them at the critical
age when they might learn linguistic skills; when they do it
is usually as captives (see Cowley 2005). More to the point,
what appears from an idealized anthropocentric model of
communicative competence as biological limitation could
also be seen as affordances for alternative forms of semiotic
practice.
Two of the most accomplished and well-known “linguistic” apes are Koko the gorilla and Kanzi the bonobo
chimpanzee. Both have been trained to use signs through
behavioral conditioning methods, including positive reinforcement most centrally. The benefit of this method is that
it allows teachers to ignore the black box of the animal
subject, its “internal” deficits, and instead break down semiotic practice into observable and manipulable patterns of
stimulus and response.
Koko was taught from a young age to form gestures
based on a modified form of American Sign Language, which
researcher Francine Patterson refers to as “Gorilla Sign Language” (GSL). With Patterson’s tutelage, it is said that Koko
can now form over 1,000 words of sign language and understand many more spoken words of English. Critics remain skeptical of the claims surrounding Koko’s signing.
They tend to query, in particular, whether a gorilla can truly
comprehend the subtleties and rules of grammar “young children seem to take to without effort” (Blackmore 2000:88)
or what role the ape’s interlocutors play in translating “nonsensical or unresponsive” utterances into acts of “saying”
(Uddin 2006:113). The problem is not simply Koko’s apparent gorillaness, but the conspicuous coconstruction of her
utterances. As indicated already, similar complications arise
with the attribution of speaker roles in impaired human
speech (Goodwin 2004; Hoffman-Dilloway 2011), where
“incompetent” speakers are aided by, or are seen to be mirroring, the linguistic competence of another. Whether or
not a fair assessment can be made of Koko’s prowess, the
very orchestration of an animal’s linguistic performance, its
continual documentation and narration as a wonder, serves
to communicate powerful messages about the naturalness of
human communication by comparison.
Inspired by these early signing experiments, SavageRumbaugh et al. (1980) designed a training method with
chimpanzees using “lexigrams”—small rectangular signs
with no inherent connection to their object of reference.
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FIGURE 1.
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A selection of Kanzi’s lexigrams (copyright the Great Ape Trust, www.greatapetrust.org)

These were mounted inside cages so that subjects would
have access to them on a regular basis for use in chimp–
chimp communication. Using operant conditioning, once
again, researchers attempted to teach common chimps not
only to use signs individually but also in combination to approximate symbolic reference.9 The studies would begin by
teaching the chimps to pair lexigrams to represent particular
foods, tools, and actions, which were ultimately structured
to elicit an understanding of categorical distinctions of a
more abstract sort between “tools,” “foods” and so on.
The initial studies had mixed success but, in a now
famous accident, an immature bonobo chimpanzee named
Kanzi, who had witnessed his adopted mother’s language
trials, showed incredible aptitude for lexigram usage and
was able to achieve levels of symbolic communication his
predecessors could not (Deacon 1997:125). According to
the Great Ape Trust, Kanzi can now recognize over 500
words, including (like Koko) many spoken words of English
(see Figure 1).
One of the most common criticisms of SavageRumbaugh et al.’s work is that Kanzi was only conditioned
to use lexigrams, which were serving as indexes that referred to past rewards and, thus, were not “true” symbols (Seidenberg and Petitto 1987). Such “cognitive props”
(Cowley 2005), the reward-based learning, the human trainers, the lexigrams, all serve as reminders of experimentally
realized linguistic skills, making the animal subject seem like
the prosthesis of the scientist, not an expressive being. To
the extent that Koko and Kanzi offer formal “proof,” it is
as trained research subjects: spoken apes, and not speaking
actors. Human children seem to “absorb” words and transform them into language, author Susan Blackmore argues,
whereas experimental apes “have to be coerced and rewarded

to learn just a few paltry signs” (2000:88). From this perspective, while both semiotic actors require the presence
of competent interlocutors, the gifts of naturally speaking
subjects allow them to internalize speech and make of it language, without the external form and force of conspicuous
manipulation. Even when Savage-Rumbaugh and others defend their research, they must negotiate a tension between
a standardized experimental protocol and the peculiar, accidental history of Kanzi’s linguistic achievements, including
his alternative biological resources as a bonobo chimp.
And yet, similar ambiguities surround ape production
of unique utterances outside of formal linguistic demonstrations. Haraway makes this clear in an analysis of the popular
narrative of Koko’s request for and adoption of a kitten, her
own animal captive to keep with her in captivity. In representations such as these, Koko is not granted the recognition
of existing in a shared, coeval world where “kittens have particular resonances in European-derived industrial cultures”
but serves as a cultural figure that “re-naturalize(s) ‘man’”
(1989:145). In most accounts of the linguistic feats of Kanzi
and Koko, scientists are not endeavoring to hybridize new
great ape societies composed of humans, gorillas, and chimps
but, rather, to use experiments with nonhuman talk to make
claims about “the human” including the pain and longing that
is thought to accompany self-understanding.
In this sense, ape language programs cannot really fail.
Even if their successes are exaggerated, they generate popular narratives that offer evidence of human distinction and
ape limitation. This does not remove risks for the participants
involved, however. Apes trained to sign offer up a range of
resonant resemblances to their human counterparts, from
moments of staged desire, as with Koko’s kitten, to signs
of apparent sexual deviance. In 2005, Koko was accused
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of sexually harassing former members of the research staff,
having touched or repeatedly asked to see their nipples. Patterson, furthermore, was accused of having pressured them
to do so for the sake of the project. The case was quickly
settled out of court, but attracted uncharacteristically negative media attention. One Tampa Bay news article referred
to Koko’s alleged request as part of a “simian nipple fetish”
(Benham 2005) and cites as evidence part of a transcript
from a public AOL chat involving (Penny) Patterson and the
gorilla in 1998:
AOL: Question: Do you like to chat with other people?
PENNY: Koko, do you like to talk to people?
KOKO: Fine nipple.
PENNY: Yes, that was her answer. “Nipple” rhymes with “people,” Okay? She doesn’t sign “people” per se, so she may be trying
to do a “sounds like . . . ” but she indicated it was “fine.”

On the one hand, the presentation of the transcript, as a news
item, is meant to suggest that Koko is a full participant in the
dialogue, an equal party who speaks in turn, perhaps even
one whose words say too much, who incriminates herself by
exposing a “fetish.” In this respect, the lawsuit and its public
reception reveal a willingness to entertain Koko’s moral
copresence. On the other hand, Patterson’s explanation for
Koko’s linguistic error (metonym? Freudian slip?) serves as
a reminder that this is a mediated ape, in some ways an
extension of the researcher . . . and vice versa. Depicted as
partners in crime, the same tension between the two female
primates is evident in other news accounts of the lawsuit,
which alternate between naming Koko and Patterson as the
ones held legally responsible. The fallen scientist playing
god forms a perfect narrative compliment to the uplifted
ape playing human.
In general, the figure of the overzealous researcher has
been the primary target for critics of ape language studies.
Psychologists Mark Seidenberg and Laura Petitto have raised
concerns about the work of Patterson and other ape language
studies by questioning the method by which ape “utterances”
are meaningfully interpreted (Seidenberg and Petitto 1981).
They point out that it was a maxim of early ape studies to
attribute greater meaning to observed ape signs than might
have been warranted, a strategy known as “rich interpretation” that was linked to the idea that captive apes should be
treated like human children to encourage language uptake.
Consider two tokens signed in succession. They might be
linked by nothing more than their indexical connection to
directly motivating objects, but could be generously interpreted as the syntactically arranged components of a sentence, because, it is assumed, a naturally developing child’s
utterances would be taken in this way too.
Seidenberg and Petitto are very familiar with ape language studies conducted on this principle. As graduate students they observed “Project Nim,” perhaps the most controversial ape language study of the 20th century. Also the
name of a celebrated recent documentary about the study
and its tragic consequences, Project Nim was an effort to
raise a chimpanzee, jokingly named Nim Chimpsky, as a hu-

man child. It was a productive failure, because it succeeded
in pointing out a possible flaw in all similar studies: the
tendency to disregard the ability that experimental apes do
have, which allows them to encourage the self-deception of
their experimenters. In a similar way, semiotician Thomas
Sebeok, another notable critic of ape language studies, likens
nonhuman sign language to a form of Clever Hans trickery
(see Hediger 2010). Experimenters are so intent on communicating across human–nonhuman barriers, they overinterpret animal behavior. In so doing, Sebeok would argue,
they actually downplay the communicative skills that nonhuman animals do possess, notably the ability to learn what
they need to do to exploit their human counterparts. The
interesting conclusion is this: apes may manipulate their
linguistic equipment so skillfully that it goes unnoticed by
experimenters as well as their critics, all of whom remain
ideologically fixated on what is going on “internally.”
AUTISM SPEAKS

Fantasies of speaking with animals or artificial life forms are
not typically motivated by the same desperation and hope
that lies behind attempts to establish channels of communication between nonverbal and verbal persons, and yet they
are vulnerable to similar semiotic complications and uncertainties. These trials are not merely about the practicalities
of communicative limits, solely, but how they are interpreted through cultural models of who speaks and how. The
models that concern me can be partly traced to wartime
Euro-America and have since come to shape practice and
methodology in computing, primatology, education, and
elsewhere. Other ideologies mediating prosthetic speech
training and evaluation may rest on different grounds.
However, people with different language impairments
may experience a similar social withdrawal, they may also
be exposed to resources for language development that they
cannot access or are not tailored to their needs (see HoffmanDilloway 2011; Ochs et al. 2005). One of the reasons that
PECS is preferred as a method is that it does not require
eye contact between the participants, only that the learner
attends to the object being exchanged. Furthermore it does
not involve imitation, but rewarded, goal directed behavior
learned through repetition and adherence to a step-by-step
approach. Rather than begin by associating word and object, the learner first learns to exchange objects for desired
“motivators” (a favorite snack, a game, etc.).
In the beginning, there are usually three participants, the
learner, the prompt, and the teacher. Between the learner
and the teacher is the PECS book, which usually contains
sheets inside which will eventually store the learner’s personal collection of symbols. The prompt stands behind the
learner out of sight; only the teacher speaks. To begin with,
there is only one symbol on the book, a laminated square
image affixed with Velcro. First the teacher presents the
learner with the motivator, when the learner reaches for it
the prompt guides their hand to the symbol on the PECS
book and helps them hand it to the teacher. When the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
FIGURE 2. PECS book (copyright with Michigan State University,
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www.msu.edu/∼toddsar2/PECS.html)
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teacher receives the symbol they name the motivator (e.g.,
23
“apple”) and hand it to the learner. Over time, the prompt
24
aids the learner less and less until the action of reaching for
25
the symbol to request the motivator is done out of habit.
26
In order to counter the tendency to favor regularity and
27
fixate on sameness, the learner is then encouraged to dis28
sociate the exchange of symbols from particular people and
29
contexts, such that they begin to generalize the practice
30 Q1 and become more persistent with communication. Finally,
31
in the discrimination phase, the learner begins to associate
32
particular symbols with particular motivator. As the learner
33
acquire familiarity with more picture–object combinations,
34
their PECS repertoire grows into pages and pages of symbols
35
(see Figure 2).
36
Like Kanzi’s lexigrams, PECS performs a link between
37
word and object in a ritual of multiple indexical and iconic
38
associations. The act of exchange is meant to evoke a link
39
between the uttered word and the desired object, just as
40
the exchange itself is meant to evoke a connection between
41
personal enjoyment and successful social interaction. In the
42
case of nonhuman apes as well as human people on the autistic
43
spectrum, the preferred philosophy of linguistic enskillment
44
is behaviorist: it depends on the identification of a stimulus
45
and a stimulus response with a particular signal, so that
46
a habit can develop that encourages the trainee to associate
47
word and object. This process is mediated by their individual
48
drive to attain some motivating end, most commonly, food.
49
PECS trainers regularly inform parents and carers new to the
50
practice that food is the best motivator and the most likely to
51
reward communication with the immediacy required for the
52
subject to build associations between objects and symbols.
53
Behaviorism is also the inspiration behind ABA (Ap54
plied Behavioral Analysis), which is a more comprehensive
55
training program for people on the spectrum, employed to
56
teach them appropriate everyday behaviors and reduce their
57
anxiety with social interactions. Together, ABA and PECS
58
represent the two approaches that are thought by the spe-
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cial needs practitioners I spoke with to have the greatest
evidentiary support. In part, this is because they can be successfully operationalized in educational and support settings,
which owes much to their behaviorist step-by-step emplotment. ABA is also heavily criticized by some members of
the autistic rights community, however, who accuse it of
reprogramming people on the autistic spectrum to bend to
social convention, rather than allowing them to develop in
their own way (see Bumiller 2008).
From this perspective, the objectification of “voice” into
PECS is an alienating process. PECS is not simply a way of
reshaping behavior, however. It is patterned on the particular skills and impairments of people on the autistic spectrum,
who are introduced to the sociality of interaction through
“fixed” attentiveness on its materiality. Some studies examining the effectiveness of PECS find marked improvement
in speech production (Carr and Felce 2007); but even those
that do not still find evidence of an improved ability to use
PECS (Howlin et al. 2007). In these cases, it may still compensate for the learner’s social impairment by offering them
a practical model for how social interaction works. As my
wife puts it, PECS provides Charlie with his own “economy”
of objects, premised on a model of sociality as exchange.
This characterization of the practice is quite fitting, because
there have been times when he seems to act as if he owes
us a debt for providing him with something, even when he
is separated from his PECS folder, and he reaches out to
exchange the nearest thing at hand.
Charlie’s use of PECS is employed as part of a distinctive semiotic repertoire of gesture and phonation to
communicate with his family, friends, and carers. Charlie’s
“requesting” gestural behavior is facilitated by established
routines for his daily activities, which he learns to select
by prompting us in various ways to attend to things in his
perceptual purview. As Goodwin (2000) explains, the success of these gestures relies on their being placed in the
correct sequence and context of interaction by Charlie’s
interlocutors—a request to watch a video should not be
confused with a request to go outside. Another, more subtle
form of communication comes from Charlie’s manipulation
of what Sicoli (2010:522) calls “voice register.” Although
most linguists associate phonation with stylistics, Sicoli argues that nonreferential acoustic shifts are performed to
index distinct speech registers in Lachixı́o Zapotec, giving
them a more pronounced role in social performance. Without the use of what Sicoli terms “lexical registers,” Charlie
employs alternations in voice to help define the parameters
of his interactions with other participants and objects. He has
used a low creaky voice, for example, to call for more bodily contact and “deep pressure” sensory stimulation, while a
tonal, breathy voice typically indicates that he would rather
focus on manipulating an external object with his hands. In
these cases, Charlie’s vocal shifts help those around him to
discern the best way to interact with him at that moment.
Unlike his gestural communication, phonation helps him
express his sensorimotor needs, which, in the case of many
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people on the autism spectrum, heavily mediate engagement
with others and the surrounding environment.
Charlie’s use of PECS has developed alongside his distinctive vocal register and his “requesting” gestures to make
up an idiosyncratic semiotic totality, a home sign system.
If evaluated relative to the achievement of “real” speech,
this range of communicative forms can appear quite limited, which can create the kinds of anxiety and uncertainty
documented in the morning school meeting mentioned at
the beginning of this article. For medically deaf Nepali home
signers discussed by Hoffman-Dilloway (2011), competence
is recognized even when they mimic or copy the signs of their
interlocutors, quite against the standards of mainstream linguistics. For people on the autism spectrum subjected to
the modern semiotic ideology of the naturally speaking subject, by contrast, competence is thought to require linguistic
performance apart from the influence of other people’s linguistic agency, stemming as it does from a communicative
interior. It is partly for this reason that some parents of autistic children express ambivalence about the usage of PECS.
The fear of contamination of speech by PECS stems from
its mediating role as a material platform, which is dependent not only on external objects for the coconstruction of
meaning but also the cooperative involvement of a more
competent linguistic actor.
But isolating linguistic actors is not so simple. Consider
the colloquial term for a learner’s PECS book among practitioners: their “voice.” As one PECS trainer informed me,
this is meant to socialize caregivers into a new conception
of language socialization, to remind them not to restrict the
learner’s access to the book and inadvertently suppress their
communicative agency, “I keep telling them that is his voice,
don’t put it on the shelf out of reach!” The reason that PECS
trainers feel it necessary to remind parents of this is the latter’s resistance to the notion that their child’s “inner” voice
is dependent on disembodied linguistic equipment.
In linguistic anthropology, “voice” is understood as “the
linguistic construction of social personae,” which “addresses
the question of ‘Who is speaking?’ in any stretch of discourse” (Keane 2000:271). In this understanding, “voicing
contrasts” are essential because: “No figure of personhood
is typifiable as a discrete voice (of whatever type) unless
it is differentiable from its surround” (Agha 2005:40). The
difficult of PECS’ voices, is that they threaten to become
indistinguishable from their equipment, from the voices of
others around them, from the surrounding world that can
overstimulate and overwhelm them. It is precisely because
of such boundary anxieties, about where speaking subjects
end and begin, that PECS, speech generating devices and
other linguistic equipment for the nonverbal remain highly
controversial.
One stunning example is the debate over Facilitated
Communication (FC), where an aid helps an otherwise nonverbal person to type messages by lifting their hand to a
keyboard. This began to spread through the United States in
the early 1990s and has since been criticized by some as a

hoax perpetuated by the will of the nonverbal subject’s linguistically competent assistants (see Jacobson et al. 2005).
Parents and caregivers so badly want to communicate with
the “real person” locked inside disabled bodies, they are
believed to bias the results of “treatment” out of desperate
hope—yet another account of the naturally speaking subject,
with their desire to communicate so strong, that they contaminate experimental encounters with unnatural language
learners. And yet, during one discussion group at Charlie’s
school the adult sibling of someone on the spectrum swore
to us that the use of FC had allowed her disabled brother to
communicate his inner thoughts for the first time. Some psychologists and linguists would likely remain skeptical of her
family’s hopeful discovery, precisely because of assumptions
about what speaking actors look like. But these assumptions
guide the interpretations of FC advocates as well. Unable
to recognize a distributed form of linguistic agency, they
instead typically cling to belief that there exist internal levels
of “hidden competence” in impaired individuals, including
concealed forms of literacy.
For PECS users, some of whom may carry a book of
symbols with them their whole lives, questions of linguistic
competence remain. In some ways, however, the attribution
of participant roles can never be taken for granted in a speech
event (see Goffman 1981; Irvine 1996). Speech devices may
complicate, in their own ways, the figuration of a speaker,
but the absence of external equipment does not change this.
The practical struggles of people on the autistic spectrum
merely restage the path of all would be symbolic actants.
One could argue that it is the struggle for communication,
not its naturalness that makes people on the spectrum so
human. As Charles Goodwin writes, discussing a man with
impaired speech following a stroke: “such a task, which
mobilizes language, gesture and social organization for the
accomplishment of action within consequential settings, sits
at the very center of what it means to be human” (2000:95).
It is not so strange for the “voice” of PECS’ books to contain
traces of the agency of others. Rather than a reflection of an
impaired subject, this could be understood as an invitation
to others to recognize the distributed competence of the
book’s owner, and engage with them in a shared form of
discourse both can securely possess (cf. Goodwin 2004).
In Charlie’s case, PECS has formed an ideal complement to the home sign system he has developed, in its focus on minimal distinctions and multisensory engagement.
The ideological separation—articulated by both parents and
carers—between PECS and “real speech” threatens to disavow the active contribution that people on the autistic
spectrum make to the process of PECS interaction and to
the encompassing totality of semiotic engagements through
their home signing. One of the reasons PECS can be successful is that it builds on the kinds of corporeal, objectual
interaction people like Charlie feel more comfortable initiating (cf. Ochs et al. 2005). Unlike words, picture symbols can be grasped in hand and studied. Unlike the beguiling, fleshy voices of neurotypical people, PECS folders are
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detachable: they can be carried, set aside, safely stored away,
or even replaced entirely by newer models.
CONCLUSION
The human is identifiable, but not definable. [Pepperell 1995:182]

I have argued that one productive way to explore staged
moments of human–nonhuman encounter is to examine
the problem of linguistic technics, of actors being equipped
and equipping others to speak. Acknowledging that all human beings find speech through the mediation of linguistic
equipment is not to disregard the corporeal and cognitive resources that make human communication possible, impaired
or otherwise, or that make nonhuman communication different. Rather, it is to recognize that even equipment such
as this is not “naturally occurring,” insofar as claims of “naturalness” or “humanness” presuppose a dehistoricized and
totalized body, always already fully human (Axel 2006). According to Derrida, interrogating the divide between human
and animal is “less a matter of asking whether one has the
right to refuse the animal such and such a power . . . than of
asking whether what calls itself human has the right to rigorously attribute to man . . . what he refuses the animal, and
whether he can ever possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible
concept, as such, of that attribution” (2003:137–138). As
Tim Ingold writes, “every being emerges, with its particular form, dispositions and capacities, as a locus of growth”
consequently, “one cannot . . . lay down the form a being
will take independently of the circumstances of its life in
the world” (2000:108–109). Often, nonverbal children with
autism spectrum conditions begin to develop normal speech,
but gradually lose these words and “regress” into nonverbal
toddlers. The idea that their rise to linguistic competence is
socially or genetically assured is a harmful delusion. Brains
and bodies do not arrive fully formed, human or otherwise,
they become enfleshed and enskilled over the course of their
growth.
One reason that cybernetics and behaviorism have influenced those who seek to reshape linguistic capacities is
that they provide models for simplifying and intervening in
the learning processes (and, hence, the growth) of both nonhumans and humans. I have argued that the ways in which
linguistic equipment is seen to extend or impugn the agency
of various actors is mediated by prominent semiotic ideologies, background assumptions about what kinds of linguistic
actors and actions are admissible.10 My use of “equipment”
is meant to complicate particular understandings of technological prostheses as lifeless extensions of communicative
intentions, housed in individual speaking bodies. This understanding of equipment and the concerns it gives rise to are
rooted in the particular telecommunication technologies and
associated mechanistic epistemologies that took hold in the
1940s and 50s as Euro-American governments concluded
one world war and prepared for another. In other places and
times, it may not be impaired or incomplete subjects, but
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otherworldly beings equipped to speak, whose limited uses
of speech actually mark them as all the more powerful.11
In anthropology, the naturally speaking subject finds expression in the caricature of “man” as the symbolic species,
the meaning-making ape. Where humans are characterized
in this way, questions of nonhuman–human characteristics
gain more importance and flirting with, demonstrating, and
crossing this boundary become powerful gestures. Representing the abstract human is a partial and contestable performance and it involves an ensemble of relations that includes
nonhumans. Indeed, there could be no definitive “humanity”
outside of staged encounters with the nonhumans that surround us, in constitutive relation to whom “the human” is
technically revealed, made fleetingly apparent. However, as
these examples of “unnatural” language learning illustrate,
this does not necessarily constitute some kind of posthuman
break. Perhaps the image of the spectrum is a more appropriate one, with new attempts to establish the distinctiveness
of human beings leading to fresh separations between them,
not only in terms of whether or not they can speak but
also whether they have the wherewithal—and can face the
risk—of “giving voice” to others.
Unnatural language trials can be staged in such a way
that they promote models of the naturally communicating
human, a cultural figure most closely identifiable with the
exceptional language teacher. Whether in the case of Koko
and Kanzi’s world-renowned human companions, or the
parents desperate to give expression to their disabled children’s hidden voices, those responsible for designing linguistic equipment often seem to overshadow their impaired
interlocutors, who become mere extensions of their only too
human communicative will. Even though “anti-internalist”
behaviorist and cybernetic epistemologies test the limits of
semiotic boundaries, in practice they also may reassert the
human as the true origin and agent of communication. Training unnatural language learners to communicate is taken as a
sign of the adeptness with which naturally speaking subjects
throw their own voices. Indeed, in the moments under consideration, occasions of “success” are regularly interpreted
as having amplified the linguistic prowess of the language
learner’s competent interlocutors, whose natural linguistic
skill appears to contaminate the trial.
Similarly, according to speech and language teachers,
one of the most common mistakes made by parents employing PECS, is the use of too many words, to incorporate praise
or larger sentences and then take the learner’s completion
of the goal-oriented task as evidence for greater linguistic
competence. PECS is thought to work by training learner
and teacher to reduce their interactions to basic components. There are, however, innumerable ways of imagining
scaled-down semiosis. The behaviorist epistemology behind
PECS insists on breaking interactions down into basic, reciprocal actions. The only word spoken is the name of the
motivator; the only gesture is the delivery of the appropriate symbol. PECS trainers advise parents to “reduce their
language,” or risk their more advanced linguistic capabilities
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dominating and distorting the learning process. If forms of
assistive communication can sometimes raise anxieties, it is
precisely because of this paradox—that methods of increasing communicability between actors may appear to widen
the gulf between them. And yet, arguably things like PECS
are more successful the less that they are made subservient
to a rigid model of what counts as a speaking actor. The dispositions of teachers cannot be ignored, but neither should
their agency be overemphasized at the expense of that of
learners, if the latter are to establish their own path toward
communicative growth.
In his discussion of “ego-affirming agency,” Alessandro
Duranti (2005) describes the minimal conditions within
which the performance of agency through language can be
recognized. At the most basic level:
when we hear the sounds produced by an individual (or group)
well enough to know that a language is being used but not distinctly
enough to identify the words that are being uttered or even the
specific language that is spoken . . . we grant the speaker the
performance of a certain type of self-assertion. [2005:455]

This recognition goes beyond the mere copresence of a
person, he argues, there is something distinct about linguistically mediated presence that asserts a kind of zero degree
agency (2005:456). The question that linguistic equipment
raises is this: what are we are to make of signs we encounter
that do not clearly constitute “a language”? In certain circumstances, technically mediated speech suggests communication that is both too sophisticated to be mere animal signaling
but also too mediated, too dependent on other people and
objects, to affirm the ego of the communicator as do the
sounds in an encounter with an alien language. One alternative is to recognize a form of semiotic agency, broader in
the sense that it can encompass other forms of nonlinguistic communication and take seriously the contributions of
impaired interlocutors to meaningful encounters. But this
is an admittedly problematic solution, one that expands the
capacity of communicative action potentially well beyond
the human. To do otherwise, however, is to potentially
misrecognize the creative ways in which “unnatural” language learners incorporate “external” linguistic equipment,
including those around them, into effective home signing
systems.
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1. Even for high-functioning people on the autism spectrum,
linguistic delays are common and persistent difficulties with
the pragmatics of language use may occur throughout their
lives (Ochs and Solomon 2004).
2. To be clear, the only parallel I am describing between the
medically deaf and people on the autistic spectrum is that their
impairments may, in certain circumstances, create relative
communicative insularity.
3. In fact, studies of abnormal linguistic development can just
as easily be used to validate internalist theories of exceptional individual neurocognition (see Thomas and KarmiloffSmith 2005).
4. Advocates of animal liberation have, at times, compared the
lives of disabled humans with nonhumans by analogy, as if
the former were closer to animals than people (see Groce
and Marks 2000). Instead, I compare technical linguistic trials involving both to highlight the interlocking histories and
“systems of domination” that include humans and nonhumans
alike (see Adams 1995:83–84).
5. Behaviorism and cybernetics resemble the twin dangers of
empiricism and physicalism that Kant sought to avoid in
his critiques, insofar as their reduction of human beings
to either a bundle of sensations or a machine process, respectively, potentially denies freedom and responsibility.
Here, too, mechanistic strands were seen to pose posthuman
risks: “Valuation, obligation, validity of thought, freedom–
these were the kind of minimal equipment, for Kant, which
needed to be saved from the encroachment of the mechanical world if we were to remain human” (Gellner 1974:
188).
6. The Turing Test was actually based on an older parlor game
that involved guessing the gender of interlocutors, and which
was similarly “predicated upon reducing sociality to a textual
form” (Boellstorff 2008: 140). Insofar as the game required
doors, separate rooms and hand written notes, it also played
upon the uncertain authorship of technically mediated communication.
7. In a sense, Strathern is describing the obverse of the “dividual”
in her earlier work (see 1988)—a person divided by different
obligations and substances may also be regarded, from another
perspective, as a person multiplied, made many.
8. Moser and Law (2001) discuss the technical mediation of
voice in their analysis of “Rolltalk,” an assistive technology for
people with advanced ALS and other physical impairments.
But their attempt to avoid making distinctions between verbal
and nonverbal acts potentially limits awareness of how such
ideologically mediated distinctions shape disabled people’s
interactions.
9. The manipulation of combinations of lexigrams is important,
precisely because symbolic associations are motivated by logical relationships between sign tokens and only rarely by
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relationships between signs and the world of rewards and
objects (Deacon 1997:79–92).
10. There are other ways of evoking such trensions surrounding
disembodied voice, as in Steven Connor’s (2000) revealing
history of ventriloquism; prosthetic speech can just as easily
inspire laughter and horror, as anxieties and disagreements.
11. One interesting example is the Thunder Bird that Hallowell
describes among the Ojibwa of Manitoba, which can only
manifest itself through dreams and thunder claps, and whose
speech only some can hear (Ingold 2000:104–106).
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